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Models of household labor supply are usually estimated using data on house-
holds where both male and female partner work in a paid job, with correction
for selection bias. From an econometric viewpoint, this approach is unsatis-
factory, as a usually large proportion of the available data (the one earner
families) is not used in the estimation. In this paper a household labor sup-
ply model is estimated using data on both one earner and two earner families,
and using flexible functional forms (i.c. the AIDS-specification). Since in
this case there exists no explicit closed form for the rationed male labor
supply equation (i.e. the male labor supply equation which applies to families
with a non-participating female), numerical methods are used. For comparison,
the model is also estimated using data on one earner families only and data on
two earner families only.
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1. Introduction
A distinctive feature of models of female labor supply is the mixed
discrete-continuous nature of the dependent variable. As long as the female
labor supply decision is analyzed in isolation, it is of minor consequence for
the estimation method whether the labor supply (or leisure demand) equation is
derived within a utility maximization framework or not. In both cases Tobit-
like methods are the appropriate tools for the estimation of the model. A num-
ber of authors have estimated models of female labor supply along these lines,
e.g. Heckman (1974), Hausman (1980) and Zabalza (1983). However, if female
labor supply is analyzed jointly with other household decision variables such
as male labor supply or commodity demands, both modelling and estimation
within a utility maximization framework becomes more complicated.
One of the main reasons for this complication is that one has to de-
rive equations that give optimal demands for all goods and male leisure if the
female partner does not work. As has been shown by Deaton and Muellbauer
(1981), the class of utility or cost functions for which these conditional or
rationed demand equations can be derived explicitly, is quite restrictive.
In Blundell and Walker (1982) , one of the few studies in which male
and female labor supply are modelled simultaneously, this problem is avoided
by only using observations where both male and female partner are working and
by correcting for selection bias. In that case the ratíoned demand for equa-
tions need not be derived and consequently flexible specífications can be
used.
However, from an econometric viewpoint this approach is unsatisfactory
as a usually large proportion of the available data (the one earner families)
is not used in estimation. Moreover, it is possible that parameter estimates
based on data on two earner families only do not apply to one earner families
because of factors not captured by the model.
In this paper we show that it is not necessary to derive an explícit
closed form for the rationed demand functions to estimate all parameters of
the model using data on both one earner and two earner families. Hence, using
flexible functional forms and using data on both one earner and two earner
families is not as incompatible as is sometimes suggested in the literature.
In section 2 we introduce Deaton and Muellbauer's Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS) as our choice of functional form for the description of house-
hold labor supply and we briefly discuss the theory of rationing within the
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AIDS-framework. In section 3 the stochastic specification of the model is pre-
sented with the corresponding likelihoods. The data is described in section 4.
Estimation results are given in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2. AIDS and Rationing
2.1. AIDS
As a specification of the model we choose the Almost Ideal Demand Sys-
tem (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1980b). Within a labor
supply context it has been used before by Ray (1982). The AIDS cost function
has the following form
~(u~ m~wf~P) - exp(afu.b) (2.1)
where
a- a0 -~- amlog wm f af log wf f a log p~-
y
t ~ g ,..g Pf 2 Ymm log- wm t Ymf iog wm iog wf t-rmy io wm ~~
f 2 Yff log2 wf t Yf log wf log PY
1 2
} 2 Yyy log p ,
a a sy
b- SO wmm wff P
and
a - 1 - am - af
Y
Sy- -Bm- sf
Ymy - -Ymm - Ymf
Yf y - -Yf f - Ymf








wm and wf are the male and female wage rate respectively, measured after taxes
and p is the price of consumption y. The a's, S's and Y's are parameters.
Since the this cost function is quadratic in the logs of prices it can serve
as a local second order approximation to an arbitrary cost function. Hence,
the AIDS cost function has a so-called flexible form.
As is well-known, the unrationed compensated demand for leisure func-
tions can be found by differentiating the cost function with respect to wm and
wf. The unrationed uncompensated demand functions are found by solving u from
wmT f wfT f u- Y- exp(afu.b) ( 2.8)
(where u is unearned family income (e.g. property income or welfare benefits)
and T is the total number of hours per period of time; Y is full income) and
substituting the solution for u into the unrationed compensated demand func-
tions.
This leads to the following specifications for the AIDS uncompensated
unrationed demand for leisure functions:
Rm -(Y,m)(am}Ymm log wm}Ymf log wftYmy log pfsm log Y-Sm.a) (2.9)
Rf -(Y~wf)(affYmf log wm}Yff
log wf-~Yfy log p-I-Rf log Y-Sf.a) (2.10)
where Rm and Rf are male and female leisure respectively.
2.2. Rationing
The rationing theory employed here has been developed by Neary and
Roberts (1980) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1981). Let us consider the
case where female leisure kf is restricted to be equal to Rf. Then the ratio-
ned cost function for the household is defined as
R
0 (u~ m~wf.P,Rf) - min (wmlCm-~wfRf-~p.ylv ~ u) ~ (2.11)
y'Rm
where v(R,m,kf,y) is the direct household utility function defined on male and
female leisure and total household consumption.
There is a well-known relationship between the rationed and unrationed
cost function:
5
CR(u~ ID~wf~P~Rf) - C(u~wm~wf~P) f ~f(wf-wf) ~ (2.12)
where wf is the female wage rate which would induce the household to choose
Rf -~f if there were no rationing.
The rationed compensated demand for male leisure function is obtained
by differentiating the restricted cost function with respect to wm. In view of
(2.12) this yields
8CR 8C(u~wm~wf~P) a C(u~wm~wf.P) awf 8wf
awm - awm f aw . a m- ICf. awm
f
8C(u~ m~wf~P) awf awf
8w } Rf aw - ~f awm m m
aC(u.wm~wf~P)
- aw (2.13)m
This is just the unrestricted compensated demand at wf - wf. Let a and b be
defined by (2.2) and (2.3) with wf replaced by wf. The uncompensated restric-
ted demand for male leisure function is found by solving u from
Y - exp(afu.b) f R,f(wf-wf) (2.14)
and next substituting the solution for u into the rationed compensated demand
function obtained from (2.13).
We will be particularly interested in the case !Cf - T, i.e., when the
female does not have a paid job. In that case we can rewrite (2.14) as
Y - exp(afu.b) , (2.15)
where
Y- Y- T(wf-wf) - T.wf ~- T.wm f u (2.16)
6
Notice that Y would be full income if the female wage rate were equal to wf.
We already know that the rationed compensated demand is equal to the unratio-
ned compensated demand with wf replaced by wf. From (2.15) it is clear that we
obtain the rationed uncompensated demand from the unrationed uncompensated
demand if we replace wf everywhere by wf and Y by Y. So, for example, the re-
stricted demand for male leisure JlR is obtained from (2.9) asm
R - - - -km -(Y~wm)(am}Ymm log wn}Ymf log wffYmy log pfBm log Y-Rm.a) (2.17)
Using (2.10) it is also clear that wf must satisfy:
T- (Y,wf)(af}Ymf log wm}Yff log wf~-Yfy log pf~f log Y-Bf.a). (2.18)
It follows from the analysis by Neary and Roberts (1980) that if the
parameters of the AIDS specification are such that the direct utility function
v is quasi-concave, there will exist a wf ~ wf satisfying (2.18) for any Rf in
the domain of v. In contrast with the essentially linear specification used
by, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1981) and Blundell and Walker (1982),
with AIDS there does not exist an explicit solution for wf. Therefore, in the
estimation of the model, numerical methods will be used.
As a final note, observe that in the general case where Rf is not ne-
cessarily equal to T, Y is defined as
Y- Y- kf(wf-wf) -(T-kf).wf f Rf.wf f T. m-f- u. (2.19)
Here (T-kf).wf is the amount of money earned by the female partner in market
work. Since Wf is the shadow price of female leisure, ~,,f,Rf is the value to
the household of the female leisure. So y is the subjectively valued full in-
come in the case of rationing. Observe that in the unrationed case wf - wf so
that the subjectíve value of female leisure is kf.wf. Since wf ~ wf, we have
that y~ y with equality holding when there is no rationing.
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3. Estimation
The only form of rationing considered in estimation is the case where
the female partner attains the maximal amount of leisure, i.e., she does not
have a paid job. In that case she i s rationed at Rf - T. We shall estimate a
model of joint labor supply of [he male and the female partner in a household
and of total consumption. As always, the budget constraint (in this case the
full income constraint) allows us to drop one equation. We have chosen to omit
the demand for total consinnption equation so that we are left with a system of
two labor supply equations ( or, equivalently, demand for leisure equations)
for the male and female partner.
Let us introduce the followíng notation with respect to the i-th
household:
i E 61 if both partners work;
i~ 8~ if only the male partner works.
The functional form of the male labor supply changes i f a household switches




R f- kf if kf ~ T
~
Rf - T if kf ~ T
~
Rm - gm(wm~wf~P,u) , if Rf ~ T
R R ~





where gf and gm are the unrestricted AIDS female and male demand for leisure
equations, respectively; gm is the restricted AIDS male demand for leisure
equation. A stochastic specification for this system is obtained by adding
error terms ef, em, em to the share form of equations (3.1), (3.4) and (3.5),
8
respectively.l) The error terms ef, em, em are assumed to follow a normal dis-
tribution with zero mean and unrestricted variance covariance matrix.
The normality assumption is primarily made for convenience. It can
only be approxímately true since all endogenous variables have a limited
range. The covariance between em and em cannot be estimated, because there are
no observations for which we can observe !Cm and Rm jointly.
In principle, the parameters of the model can be estimated on three
types of data.
Case I
Data on both 60 and 61 are used. The likelihood of the observations is then:
~ i




where sf, sm and sm are the budget shares corresponding to Rf, kmand Rm, res-~
pectively and T is defined as T- T.wf~Y. hl is the joint density of sfi and
~, i
sl and h2 is the joint density of sfl and sm . Both densities are marginalsm i
of the joint density of sfi, sm and s~ .
Case II
Only data on 61 are used. The likelihood of the observations is
T
L2 - q hl(sfi'sm) ' J h3(sfi)dsfi'i E 61
~iwhere h3 is the marginal density of sf .
Case III
Only data on 60 are used. The likelihood of the observations is
(3.7)
1) We do not allow explicitly for random preferences at the present stage.
This extension remaíns an important goal for future research. An econometric
model of consumption behavior allowing for rationing and random preferences
has been estimated by Lee and Pitt (1983). However, they only consider ratio-
ning at zero quantities, which simplifies their analysis considerably.
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~
L3 - II J hl(sfl,sm)dsfl ' J h3(sfl)dsfl
i E e0 T
(3.8)
We estimate the paramaters in the model (3.1)-(3.5) for each of these
three cases. These likelihoods are maximized using a quasi-Newton algorithm
which requíres no (analytical) derivatives, as provided by computer routines
of the NAG-Library (E~14JBF). For Cases I and III, equation (2.18) has to be
solved numerically for all elements of A0, for all evaluations of the likeli-
hood function, needed to attain the global maximum of the likelihood and to
calculate the estimated (asymptotic) variance-covariance matrix of the maximum
likelihood estimaters. The technique used is a combination of the methods of
linear interpolation, linear extrapolation and bisection (NAG-library,
CQISAZF). Although concavity of the cost function and hence unicity of wf can
not be guaranteed for all elements of A~, we always found a unique wf each
time equation (2.18) was solved.
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4. The data
The models in section 3 have been estimated using data from a labor
mobility survey in the Netherlands, conducted in the Fall of 1982 by the
Netherland Central Bureau of Statistics and the Institute for Social Research
of Tilburg University. The sample has been drawn randomly from the population
of all households in the Netherlands whose head is between 18 and 65 years of
age; it contains 1315 households.
From this sample we took a subsample of households containing at least
two adults of different sex, where the male partner is an employed wage ear-
ner. The size of the subsample is 507; in 197 households the female partner is
also an employed wage earner, in 310 households the female partner does not
have a paid job. Thus, we excluded the self-employed, the households with only
one adult, the households where the male partner is unemployed, retired, going
to school, disabled, etc.
To be able to estimate model (3.1)-(3.5) we need observations on (po-
tential) wage rates, also of females who did not have a paid job at the time
of the survey. We followed the standard procedure of constructing a wage equa-
tion for females on the basis of the households for which we observe the fe-
male wage rate. In our sample, this is only the case for the 139 households
where the female partner works at least 15 hours a week.
Using Heckman's procedure to correct for selectivity bias, the follo-
wing wage equation was estimated (t-values in parentheses):
wf - 2.14 f 0.26 AGE - 0.003 AGE2 t 1.68 DUM1 f
(0.36) (0.63) (-0.74) (1.32)
2.12 DUM2 t 3.01 DUM3 f 1.69 a, R2 - 0.14
( 2.78) (1.23) ( 1 .34)
DUM1, DUM2 and DUM3 are dummy varíables to represent education, a is the esti-
mated inverse of the Mill's-ratio (see Heckman (1979)).
In the estimation of the model the predicted values (with omission
of ~) for both participating and non-participating females were used as an
instrument for female wage rate.
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5. Results
The model has been estimated for the three cases distinguished in sec-
tion 3. In addition, for case I(data on both rationed and unrationed house-
holds are used) the model has been re-estimated for subsamples that are homo-
geneous with respect to family size.
5.1. No family size effects
The results of the ML-estimation for the three cases are summarized in
table 1. Comparison of the parameter estimates across columns suggests that
the three different cases do not yield dramatically different results. The
estimates obtained in case I are the most accurate ones, because more observa-
tions are used than in the other two cases. The standard errors in case III
are much larger than in cases I and II. This is due to the fact that in case
ïiï (data on one earner iamiiies oi~iy) tiiéïe is no ~ariation in fe~~,ale labor
supply.
Although likelihood ratio tests of the equality of parameters across
columns reject the equality hypothesis,l) drawing the labor supply functions
implied by the parameter estimates yield similar results. See figure 1.
1) The estimates of the a's, s's and Y's of each case were inserted in the
likelihood functions of all other cases. In all (six) cases the resulting teststatistic implied rejection at the 5~-level of the equality hypothesis.
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Table 1. Estimation resultsa) (asymptotic standard errors in parentheses).
Parameters Case I Case II Case III
a 0.64 0.69 0.69
m (0.021) (0.023) (0.122)
af 0.35 0.27 0.31
(0.052) (0.065) (0.222)
y 0.11 0.10 0.10mm (0.010) (0.013) (0.112)
Ymf -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
(0.017) (0.021) (0.119)
Yff 0.11 0.15 0.15
(0.028) (0.026) (0.208)
S -0.86 -0.90 -0.97
m (0.092) (0.116) (0.575)
Rf 0.37 0.17 0.19
(0.059) (0.090) (0.373)
0 0.026 0.024 -
m (0.0017) (0.0012)
af 0.065 0.036 -
(0.0036) (0.0026)











observations 507 197 390
a) a0 was fixed a priori for computational reasons (see Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980b) and Ray (1982).
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The male labor supply functions is backward bending in the lower ran-
ges of wm and forward bending for high values of wm. Male labor supply is
rather inelastic, both with respect to wf and wm. Apart from the familiar in-
terpretation that substitution and income effect cancel out more or less, this
finding may also point at institutional constraints which keep most males at a
40-hour work week. Notice that hm tends to be even less elastic with respect
to m in rationed families, where the female does not have a paid job. These
appear to be the traditional families where the female does not work and the
male has a full-time (- 40 hours a week) job. Note that hp~ is perfectly in-m
elastic with respect to wf, as it should be.
Female labor supply is more responsive than male labor supply to both
the male and the female wage rate. If the male wage rate goes up, female labor
supply falls. If the female wage rate rises, female labor supply rises as
well. The only clear difference between the three cases is that for case II
~(only two earner families) hf is higher at any given female wage rate than for
cases I all families used or III (only one earner families). This suggests
that using the (relatively small) truncated sample of two earner families only
may lead to bias. However, so far we have ignored the effects of family compo-
sition. The distribution of family sizes is different in the three cases so
the dífferences may simply be due to the omitted family size factor.
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7'able 2. Fatimation results case I for different family sizes
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses).
Family
size
Parameters N- 2 N- 3 N- 4 N~ 5 All householdsl)
am 0.52 0.66 0.67 0.50 0.64
(0.059) (0.152) (0.023) (0.033) (0.021)
af 0.51 0.12 0.33 0.64 0.35
(0.110) (0.101) (0.044) (0.067) (0.052)
Ymm 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.11(0.017) (0.106) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
Ymf -0.16 -0.01 -0.15 -0.22 -0.11(0.015) (0.098) (0.024) (0.010) (0.017)
Yff 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.17 0.11(0.031) (0.126) (0.035) (0.023) (0.028)
S -0.53 -0.62 -0.97 -0.55 -0.86m
~-- (0.334j (U.L4y) (0.166) (O.i79) (v.092)
Sf 0.03 0.47 0.29 -0.11 0.37
(0.183) (0.144) (0.102) (0.182) (0.059)
Q 0.013 0.028 0.031 0.027 0.026
m (0.0010) (0.0048) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0017)
of 0.050 0.050 0.054 0.043 0.065
(0.0040) (0.0089) (0.0052) (0.0065) (0.0036)
aR 0.035 0.012 0.025 0.029 0.028
m (0.0047) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0020)
p(em;ef) 0.08 -0.09 0.05 0.20 0.28
(0.217) (0.258) (0.120) (0.158) (0.110)
p(eID;ef) 0.11 0.21 0.36 -0.90 -0.68
(0.158) (0.387) (0.316) (0.042) (0.138)
Log L 432.5 204.9 427.9 288.2 1236.9
Number of
observations 118 75 190 124 507
1) First column table 1.
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In table 2 we give the estimation results for case I for subsamples
with equal numbers of family members. Now the columns show some clear diffe-
rences, especially with respect to Sf. A likelihood ratio test of the equality
of parameters across subsamples decisively rejects the equality hypothesis.l~
Figure 2 depicts the labor supply functions of families of different size im-
plied by these estimates.
1) The test statistic ( 233.2) follows
freedom. X095(36) ~ X0.95(40) - 55.76.
a X2-distribution with 36 degrees of
17
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Obviously, the highest female participation rate and the largest num-
ber of hours worked by the female, occurs in families without children. When
there are children, the female participation rate í s very low, unless the male
wage rate is very low or the female wage rate is very high. In all cases the
male labor supply function is rather inelastic.
Finally, we have i nvestigated whether the differences in family compo-
sition between the three cases can account for the differences in parameter
estimates. We have re-estimated the model for family size 4 for all three
cases. The differences between the cases remain significant. ( We have not re-
estimated the model for other family sizes because the number of observations
would in some cases have been very small.) There may be a number of causes for
the significant differences. Firstly, it may simply be due to the fact that
the partícipation and hours decision cannot be described within one framework.
Secondly, there may be specification errors, e.g. because family composition
should be i ncorporated ín a more sophisticated way, or because there are omit-
tcd Lal tVrJ . iii cithci ~~..~ .~.~i d3t:.,.. t`::~ ..3r:':er f~mi 1 ina nnlv tn al en~ ) ~~ J
model the behavior of one earner households seems to be inappropriate.
20
6. Concluding remarks
t~odels of household labor supply are usually estimated using data on
two earner families only. This approach is motivated by the fact that the use
of data on families with one earner requires the analysis of corner solutions.
Although the theory of rationing provides an appropriate framework for the
analysis of corner solutions, only restrictive functional specifications allow
for a closed form for the utility maximizing labor supply in such cases.
However, using numerical methods, we have estimated a household labor
supply model using data on both one earner and two earner families, and using
flexible functional forms.
The labor supply functions in figures 1 and 2 look definitely non-
linear, indicating the need to use flexible functional forms. The results pre-
sented in table 1 indícate, moreover, that for reasons of estimation accuracy
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